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ABSTRACT

Although trade liberalization has progressed steadily during the postwar period, Congressional trade votes are consistently controversial and contentious matters. Some scholars have explained the endurance of trade barriers by arguing that protectionist interests have organizational advantages (Schattschneider 1935; Destler 1986; Cassing, McKeown and Ochs 1986). More recently, however, Bailey (2003) has claimed that diffuse interests, particularly skilled labor, exert an important and consistent influence on congressional trade voting by virtue of anticipated reaction (Kingdon 1973; Denzau and Munger 1986; Arnold 1990; Verdier 1994). The logic is that representatives serve diffuse groups of voters because failing to do so will lead rival politicians, interest groups, the media and the president to activate interests that benefit from free trade.

These competing claims speak to broader debates about the extent to which constituent interests and preferences motivate legislators' votes. There are, however, two limitations of extant work on Congressional trade votes. First, in assessing the relative influence of constituency, almost all of the studies employ aggregate measures of constituency interest, rather than actual opinion in the member's state or district. Second, previous work generally only specifies free-trade versus protectionist interests and does not consider whether representatives' votes reflect the mean interests of the whole state or of the member's partisans. In this paper, we test the linkages between constituency opinion and key trade votes in the Senate from 1988 to 1994 using data from the ANES Senate Election Study. Employing micro-level evidence, we find support for the impact of constituent policy preferences on certain Senate trade votes.

Congressional trade votes are consistently contentious. The controversy surrounding trade agreements magnifies the importance of both individual legislators' votes and scholars' models of their voting behavior. For many years, academics explained trade outcomes according to interest groups' organizational abilities. Interest groups, in this account, have concentrated interests and are therefore advantaged over diffuse interests in their ability to become politically organized. Organized groups with greater resources than others are, in turn, more likely to have their policies enacted (Gilligan 1997; Schattschneider 1935; Destler 1986; Cassing, McKeown and Ochs 1986). More recently, however, Bailey (2003) has challenged conventional wisdom by arguing that diffuse interests, particularly skilled labor, exert an important and consistent influence on congressional trade voting by virtue of anticipated reaction (Kingdon 1973; Denzau and Munger 1986; Arnold 1990; Verdier 1994). The logic is that representatives serve diffuse groups of voters because failing to do so will lead rival political forces to activate interests associated with trade policy.

This paper extends the trade literature in two ways. First, it argues that the diffuse interests argument underplays the importance of citizens' political attitudes, which do not necessarily align neatly with their objective economic situations. Second, whereas previous studies tend to deemphasize the role of political parties in trade issues, we show that Senators' partisan identification and the preferences of partisans and partisan delegates in their states often affect legislative trade votes.

Certainly, there are skill divides within the electorate on trade. Recent research has established that more highly educated individuals are more likely to support free trade than the less-skilled (Scheve and Slaughter 2000; Bailey 2003). However, political beliefs and long term predispositions might also influence preferences over free trade. While we show that

constituents' material welfare affects their representatives' trade votes, we also show that Senators respond to the political preferences expressed by two constituencies: their geographic constituency and their partisan constituency. These political preferences are distinguishable from voters' "objective" economic positions and exert an independent influence on elite decision-making.

First, we argue that voters' political attitudes influence Senators' trade votes. Contrary to past work (Gartzke & Wrighton 1998; Bailey 2003), which employed only aggregate, objective measures of constituent interests, our study includes in addition subjective measures aggregated from micro-level opinion data and finds support for the impact of constituent policy preferences on Senate trade votes. Our previous work (1999, 2001, 2003), finds that these political attitudes and beliefs affect the voting behavior of citizens, but here we show that these variables affect the voting behavior of their representatives as well.

Second, we claim that partisanship structures key trade votes in important ways. In addition to responding to the attitudes of their geographic constituency, as Bailey (2003) argues, Senators respond more specifically to the trade preferences of partisan constituents and partisan delegates from their state (which proxy state party activists' opinions). We contend that the attitudes of these constituents are critical elements of partisan influence on legislators, helping to explain large portions of the variation on key trade votes. At a more basic level, the Senator's own party identification will also influence his or her trade votes, especially during periods when preference diversity within the party in Congress shrinks and as the amount of disagreement between parties increases (Aldrich and Rohde 2001). When these two conditions exist, a state known as conditional party government, we expect partisanship to be a strong predictor of trade votes.

The paper proceeds as follows. The first section discusses competing views of interest representation and relates them to trade politics. Section two discusses theoretical links between constituency preferences and trade votes. Section three delineates the hypotheses, methods, and data. Section four presents the main empirical results, and section five discusses the implications of our findings.

I. Trade and Economic Interests

Interest Representation

Conventional wisdom argues that diffuse interests are politically disadvantaged. The collective action problems of diffuse interests dominate much of the trade literature. Olson's seminal work (1965) provides the theoretical foundation. It argues that narrow, concentrated interests can organize more effectively than larger, more diffuse interests. Following this logic, many studies of trade policy assert that the average voter, rationally recognizing that an individual vote is unlikely to influence government policy, remains ill-informed on policy matters. Therefore, instead of representing uninformed voters, office-seeking representatives serve interest groups that provide necessary campaign support in return for favorable legislation (Stigler 1971).

The influence of this logic is evident in many studies of trade barriers (Schattschneider 1935; Grier, Munger, and Roberts 1994; Cassing, McKeown and Ochs 1986; Destler 1992). These studies note that producers and workers threatened by imports are more concentrated and better organized than those who benefit from trade. Consequently, scholars have concluded that the influence of narrow interests is stronger than that of diffuse voters. Although deft in linking

micro-incentives to macro outcomes, the theory cannot, however, explain the largely (though not uniformly) liberal bent of American trade policy since the Great Depression.

Seeking to remedy this over-prediction of protection, more recent scholarship (Milner 1988; Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast 1997; Gilligan 1997; Bailey 2003) has focused instead on interests supporting free trade in order to explain congressional behavior. In Bailey's (2003) work, diffuse rather than narrow interests prevail in trade politics. He demonstrates that representatives from districts and states with highly educated populations are consistently more likely to vote in favor of free trade than those representing the low-skilled. This story is reassuring in terms of democratic theory, because constituent interests prevail. Bailey's account, however, does not develop a theory of micro-linkages to explain his empirical evidence. His argument depends on establishing links between the objective economic position of voters, their policy preferences, and legislative vote choice. Yet, his data can only provide an indirect measure of voters' preferences over trade policy. In particular, he must assume that education levels determine preferences about free trade. Empirically, in assessing the relative influence of constituency, Bailey's study employs aggregate measures of constituency interest, rather than actual opinion in the member's state or district. As a result, his method requires him to assume that those with similar economic circumstances will have similar political assessments. We believe this assumption is untenable, and we are fortunate to have data to demonstrate this point. There are circumstances under which individuals may adopt preferences that are not in line with their "objective" circumstances. We avoid having to make this assumption by adding measures of constituent policy preferences and predispositions into our analysis.

In a related vein, while extant work has focused on whether diffuse or concentrated interests have more sway over trade votes, the influence of the political party has been largely

absent. The theory of collective action does locate the advantage of concentrated over diffuse interests in the relatively greater ability of the former to be able to organize politically. However, Olson himself (1982) noted that there was one potential source of organization of diffuse interests (or an “encompassing group”), the majority-seeking political party. Thus, it is at least theoretically possible that the political party will, in its role of organizing diffuse interests to win electoral majorities, compete with organized special interests in shaping trade policy. Bailey (2003) noted the importance of skilled labor empirically, and we will show the empirical importance of the preferences of the member’s partisan constituency, as well as the preferences of partisan delegates.

The time period that we investigate, covering the 1988 through 1992 national elections, is at the beginning of the contemporary high water mark in ideological polarization between the two parties in Congress (see, for example, Aldrich and Rohde, 2000). Fiorina (2004) has recently demonstrated that elites in the parties are polarized ideologically (and over a host of political issues) but the general public is not. Jacobson (2000) has shown that Democratic and Republican “activists”—those who engage in a number of political activities in addition to voting—can exert a great influence on congressional nominations. It remains to be seen, however, if influence of activists, along with growing polarization between partisan elites, extends to the issue of trade. In theory, the political party may serve as the organizational link that ties the long-term, diffuse political beliefs in the public into influence over the increasingly potent effect of party affiliation on voting choices.

II. Economic Insecurity, Policy Preferences, and Representation

Existing arguments about the influence of constituent interests on trade votes make several implicit linkages among the various circumstances that confront citizens and their actual or latent preferences over trade policy. First, they assume that voters' objective economic situations determine their policy preferences.¹ Second, these policy preferences of citizens influence their representatives' behavior.

The first assumption stems directly from trade theory. The connection between skills and insecurity is clear. Employment can be threatened if production or other economic changes mean that one does not have the requisite skills to retain one's job. This road to insecurity is especially relevant in the current climate of globalization. Economic theory suggests that trade openness introduces dynamic elements into an economy and shifts skill requirements and the demand for different skills, creating both winners and losers in the job market. The insecurity felt by the losers can be a source of distinct policy preferences.

The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) theory predicts that open trade will adversely affect owners of locally scarce factors, as their ability to compete in world markets is hampered by a lack of comparative advantage. Because unskilled labor is relatively abundant in the world economy and high-skilled labor is relatively scarce, HOS predicts that unskilled labor in advanced economies will be threatened by globalization while high skilled labor will benefit (Leamer 1998; Rodrik 1997).

However, the links between objective economic circumstances, perceived insecurity, and policy preferences are more tenuous than trade theory suggests. The development of policy preferences can be divided into two parts. First, an individual must internalize objective risk or objective benefits for them to have any possible influence on preferences. Second, the

¹ In Bailey's case, these preferences may not actually be activated but have the potential to be activated by interest groups, candidates, and the media.

translation of economic conditions into political choices is not unmediated. Previous beliefs exert a strong influence on policy preferences. Individuals with similar economic circumstances but different beliefs can therefore be expected to make systematically different political assessments and choices. Our previous research (1999 a,b; 2001, 2003) supports this contention.

The second theoretical link is between policy preferences and legislative votes. The theory presumes that legislators will vote based on constituent preferences. Several scholars have found that constituent interests are critical determinants of legislators' behavior on a host of issues (Asher and Weisberg 1978; Mayhew 1974; Kingdon 1977; Miller and Stokes 1963). The need to seek reelection is a motivating factor for legislators to represent their constituents (Mayhew 1974). However, more recent studies of representation argue that the strength of this relationship may depend on whether the issues are complex or party defining (Hill and Hurley 2003). In particular, Hill and Hurley (2003) argue that most studies of trade find weak effects for constituency preferences (though the effects are stronger if objective state indicators are used) because they are complex and cut across party lines. We want to examine whether trade votes have become more party defining in this period of increasing ideological polarization among elites. We depart from Hill and Hurley (2003) in that we do not look only at the whole constituency. Rather, we argue that in a period of high polarization, several findings would be consistent with the importance of the party, two at the elite level and two at the level of constituents. First, the partisanship of the member might influence trade votes. Second, the preferences of partisan delegates (either on their own terms or as proxies for the preferences of partisan activists in the Senator's home state) might influence member voting. Finally, either the partisan and ideological views of the whole constituency or the Senator's partisan (and hence

renomination) constituency can be consequential. Therefore, we consider the effects of both partisan policy preferences and those of the full constituency on legislators' trade votes.

These theoretical underpinnings resound with past work in one key way: underscoring the importance of constituent interests as an explanation for elite behavior. However, in stressing the importance of individual opinions, and including micro-level evidence, our work also represents a significant contribution. Interests that are relevant to trade politics are not diffuse; rather, interests that cohere along ideological and partisan lines profoundly impact legislators' behavior. This suggests that, while economic circumstances are important, models that fail to include constituent and partisan policy preferences are misspecified. The next section describes the hypotheses related to these claims.

III. Hypotheses, Methods, and Data

Summary of Hypotheses

State Objective Conditions

- H1: The higher the state's level of trade openness, the more likely the Senator will vote for free trade.
- H2: The higher percentage of college educated in a state, the more likely the Senator will vote for free trade (Bailey Hypothesis)
- H3: The greater the percent unionized in a state, the more likely the Senator will vote against free trade.

Constituent, Partisan, and Partisan Delegate Attitudes

- H4: The better the constituents' (and partisans') retrospective economic assessments, the more likely the Senator will vote for free trade.
- H5: The more socially conservative the constituents' (and partisans') attitudes on spending issues, the more likely the Senator will vote for free trade.
- H6a: The more Republican the constituents (and partisans) are, the more likely the Senator will vote for free trade.
- H6b: The more ideologically conservative the constituents (and partisan) are, the more likely the senator will vote for free trade.
- H7: The more supportive of free trade the partisan delegates are, the more likely the senator will vote for free trade.

Senator's Ideology, Committee Membership, and Fundraising Sources

H8: Democratic Senators will be more likely to vote against free trade than Republican Senators.

H9: Senators who are members of the Trade committee will be more likely to vote for free trade.

H10: The greater the Senator's campaign contributions from multinational corporations (MNCs) relative to contributions from labor, the more likely the Senator will vote for free trade.

H11: The higher the Senator's chamber of commerce score, the more likely the Senator will vote for free trade.

Data and Context of Trade Votes

Three major trade votes in the Senate, spanning from 1991 to 1994, are analyzed in this paper, one for each of three major policy decisions: Fast Track (1991), NAFTA, and GATT.

We selected these three votes because they were key trade issues and each contained a particular decision that was a key vote. All three issues were controversial votes and were well-publicized, even if to varying degrees, with NAFTA being the most prominent. Given that they were salient, they should have been made less subtle and more directed toward public attention. Thus we should be more likely to find constituency effects on senator voting compared to more obscure trade votes. However, trade votes are a more difficult test of the influence of party in that virtually all studies of trade politics tend to minimize the influence of political parties in trade votes.

Whereas Bailey pooled trade votes, we deliberately chose to run separate analyses for each key vote. This enables us to test the importance of contextual factors that are specific to each vote² as well as test the influence of partisan attitudes on different trade issues. Both of these effects may be muted by pooling. Hill and Hurley (2003) argue strongly against pooling votes on these grounds. They show that representational linkages between constituents and

² For example, in NAFTA projected job losses in low-skilled sectors in Mexico were clearly salient politically, as were projected economic gains to states that traded heavily with Mexico.

representatives on issues like trade vary over time with respect to partisan cleavages and over issues with respect to complexity. Since we expect the influence of constituent opinion to vary across votes, separate analyses are more appropriate.

To these data, we merged information collected by Bailey (2003) on free trade and protectionist interests, which include both state level objective factors and PAC contributions by labor and multinational corporations to senators, as well as control variables, such as the party of the member. We also obtained state-level partisan delegate data on delegates' attitudes about free trade from the 1988 and 1992 Convention Delegate Studies.³ We also collected data to control for whether or not the member served on the trade committee. Finally, for measures of constituency opinion, we relied on data from the pooled 1988-1992 Senate National Election Study. Before turning to the measures used in the analysis, we will briefly discuss each major trade vote.

Fast Track

In March of 1991, President Bush requested extension of fast track procedures (which gives Congress 60 days to act once a trade agreement is submitted and requires an up or down vote without amendments), in order to continue talks on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and to begin talks on a U.S. Mexico free trade pact. There was a great deal of opposition to fast track from labor and environmental groups, who argued that an agreement with Mexico would cost U.S. jobs and lead to more pollution since environmental regulations in Mexico were weaker. The leadership in both parties supported the extension. We analyze the Senate's vote on resolution 78 to bar the extension of fast track negotiating authority for the

³ We thank Richard Herrera for sending us these datasets.

president. Free trade interests prevailed, with the Senate voting to reject the resolution, 36-59, on May 24th.⁴

NAFTA

The North American Free Trade Agreement (HR 3450) eliminated all tariffs between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico over 15 years and also dropped many other trade barriers. With strong opposition from organized labor, the bill faced uphill battles, particularly in the House. The administration faced a close vote in the House, which voted for the agreement 234-200. The vote was not as close in the Senate on November 20th, 1993, which supported NAFTA with a vote of 61-38. However, support for the bill came largely from GOP members, with 34 of 44 voting for the agreement, and only 27 of 55 Democrats voting in favor of it.⁵

Uruguay Round

The last vote we analyze is the final vote to implement the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Uruguay Round Agreement (GATT, S 2467). The bill made changes to U.S. laws to bring them into agreement with the terms of the GATT agreement and provided financing to offset the loss of tariff revenues over the first five years of the agreement. The agreement promised to reduce tariffs worldwide, reduce non-tariff barriers to trade, and establish the World Trade Organization. Though Clinton faced opposition within his own party, the bill passed both houses by a comfortable margin after the November elections in 1994, 288-146 in the House, and 76-24 in the Senate.⁶

Models and Measures

⁴ See *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*. 1991. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Pages 118-120.

⁵ See *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*. 1993. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Pages 171-179.

⁶ See *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*. 1993. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics. Pages 182-183.

We model trade votes as a function of objective state level factors, subjective economic perceptions of the constituency, policy preferences of the constituency, policy preferences of partisan delegates, and control variables related to the senator. The general model is as follows:

$$\text{Pr}(\text{Vote Free Trade}) = b_0 + b_1 - b_2 \text{OS} + b_3 \text{S} + b_4 - b_6 \text{P} + b_7 \text{PD} + b_8 - b_{11} \text{C} + e$$

Where OS stands for objective state conditions related to trade in the senator's state,

Where S stands for subjective economic perceptions of the senator's constituency,

Where P stands for policy preferences, partisanship and ideology of the senator's constituency,

Where PD stands for policy preferences of state partisan delegates, and

Where C stands for control variables related to the senator

Since we are agnostic in regard to expectations concerning whether senators are most responsive to the whole constituency, their fellow partisans in the state, or partisan delegates, we estimate two models for each trade vote: one with mean subjective perceptions and policy preferences of the whole constituency and one with these measures for the individuals that share the partisan identification of the member.

The dependent variables are the three trade votes, which were recoded such that a 1 indicates a pro free-trade vote, and zero otherwise. We use several indicators of state level objective characteristics from the Bailey data set. For economic conditions related to trade, we included two measures: the state's export share of production and the change in imports in each state in the years prior to each trade vote. Since we suspected that these measures are tapping into a similar concept, we performed principal components factor analysis on the measures for each constituency, and in both analyses a single factor with an eigenvalue over 1 emerged. Since the two measures contributed equally to the factor score, we just created an additive index of the two measures. Overall, we expect the populations in more open states to be supportive of trade,

which should increase the likelihood of a pro-trade vote. For state demographic characteristics we use the percent college educated as a proxy for skilled labor, and the percent of the labor force that is unionized. The former measure should increase the likelihood of voting in a pro free trade direction, while the latter should decrease the likelihood.

We also added two specific contextual variables to the NAFTA model. Since the controversy about NAFTA in Congress centered partly on projected state-level job losses, we include estimates of actual job losses incurred after NAFTA was implemented (from 1993 to 2002). We also include a measure of each state's trade with Mexico. On the one hand, preexisting trade might create a more hospitable climate for NAFTA, since it would be less of an economic shock. On the other hand, we reason that job losses from previous trade might increase public opposition to the agreement and lead to an anti-NAFTA vote.

For subjective retrospective economic assessments, we use three questions from the Senate election study, one that asks about retrospective evaluations of one's personal economic situation, the other on the nation's economic situation, and finally one on the state's economic situation. All three ask respondents to rate the economic situation on a five-point scale, coded such that higher values are better off. We collapsed the mean value in each state to create economic perception measures for the whole constituency. We then collapsed the mean value by party, and matched the party value to the party of each member in the given state. Finally, since we suspected that these measures are tapping into a similar concept, we performed principal components factor analysis on the three measures for each constituency, and in both analyses a single factor emerged with an eigenvalue over 1. Thus, we include one factor, labeled retrospective evaluations, for the whole constituency and another for the partisan constituency.

We expect positive coefficients on each factor, since if one is better off they should be more supportive of free trade.

We rely on several variables for assessments of policy preferences. The Senate Election study asked a series of questions about respondents' preferences about spending on a series of policy areas. All of the questions were coded on a three-point scale, with higher values indicating a preference to reduce spending. We include spending questions on social security, food stamps, childcare, and assistance to the unemployed. Finally, we include the standard seven-point party identification and ideology scales as measures of long-term predispositions. Since all of these questions were coded in a conservative direction, we expect positive coefficients on the variables. As with the subjective measures, we collapsed the mean value of each variable by state and merged this to the senator's vote data. We also collapsed the mean value of each by party and matched the corresponding mean to the senator's party, by state. Since the spending measures are likely tapping into a similar construct, we again performed principal components factor analysis on the spending measures for the whole constituency and then again for the partisan constituency. For both analyses, a single factor had an eigenvalue over one and we scored this factor for the whole and partisan constituency and label the factor "spending."

The partisan delegate measure is from the 1988 and 1992 surveys of convention delegates. We used the question that asks for the level of support on placing new limits on imports. Respondents were asked for their level of support on a four point scale. We collapsed the mean value of the measure by party and by state and merged this by state and party to the member voting data.

We also include several other measures that are not direct constituency measures. As a central measure of partisan affiliation, each Senator is coded 1 if the senator is a Democrat, and zero otherwise. Recall that we expect a negative sign on this variable since Democrats have been less supportive of free trade. We also include the net balance of conservative to liberal PAC contributions to the senator (measured as the difference from Labor and Multinational Corporations [MNC-Labor Money]), where we expect a positive coefficient. We also include a dummy variable for whether the member was on the Trade Committee. We expect positive coefficients for this variable, which serves as a measure of preference extremity (that is, Senators who are a member of that committee are expected to have joined due to more extremely pro-openness trade preferences). Finally, we include the member's Chamber of Commerce Score, which should have a positive effect.⁷

IV. Results

We will discuss the results for each of the trade votes separately. For each vote, we ran two models: one with the mean constituency measures, and another with the partisan constituency measures.⁸ Given that the dependent variable is dichotomous, we ran logit analyses.⁹ For each vote, we will discuss the results for each model (reduced forms of both models are available in the Appendix). We then compare the model performance across the two models with respect to the percentage correctly predicted, the pseudo R-squared, and the proportional reduction in error. Finally, we examine how the addition of variables enhances, or

⁷ Bailey also includes the previous vote margin as a control variable, which he argues should make members more supportive of free trade. The variable was insignificant in all but one model, and in this model the sign was in the wrong direction and the inclusion of the measure did not impact the significance of the other variables. Bailey also includes the percent vote for Perot in 1992 for his analysis of trade votes from 1993-1994. We found that this variable was significant and negative, as expected, for the mean constituency and party constituency models of GATT, but the inclusion did not change the significance of the other variables.

⁸ For the party constituency models, we could not include the party identification of the partisans since it was too highly correlated with the party of the member.

⁹ We recognize that we have two-levels of data, state level and variables related to the members. We supplement the logit results with multi-level logit models and report these in the footnotes related to each model.

fails to enhance, the models. The procedure we follow for each vote is to first see how well the model performs with a simple model in which we only include the party identification of the member. We then add in other member variables and see whether these enhance the baseline model, according to a likelihood ratio test, and the ability to predict voting patterns. We then add in the objective state measures and compare the addition of them to the model with all member variables. The next step is to add in the whole constituency subjective and attitudinal measures and partisan delegate measures and compare these to the model with member variables and objective state measures. Finally, we compare the partisan subjective and attitudinal measures to the model with member variables and objective state measures. The results from these model performance measures can be found in the Appendix.

Fast Track 1991

The results for the 1991 vote on extending fast track negotiating authority to President Bush are presented in Table 1.¹⁰ The exports measure was not included in the Bailey data set for this year, so we only include the imports change measure in the models. We expect the import change measure to have a negative sign, since states with increased levels of imports may be more likely to reject increased free trade. The union measures led to problems in estimation due to multicollinearity, so they were not included in the models.

The second column in Table 1 reports the logit results for the whole constituency. In the column next to the logit results, we report the first differences moving from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean for each variable, with the

¹⁰ We also ran random-intercept multi-level models using XT logit in STATA because intra-class correlations indicated that our observations were partly “nested” in states, which violates the assumption of independence of observations and may lead to biased standard errors. The results for the logit and xtlogit models were the same, so we report the logit models for ease of presentation. This was also the case for the partisan constituency model.

exception of dummy variables, where we report the difference moving from the minimum to the maximum. For the whole constituency model, we find that the change in imports measure is significant and negative as expected, and the substantive impact is substantial, decreasing the likelihood of voting for fast track by 55.7%. However, the percent with a college degree is not significant. The retrospective assessment factor is significant, but in an unexpected direction, while the spending measure is significant and in the expected positive direction. The effect of the spending measure is also substantial, increasing the likelihood of voting for fast track by 55.9% moving from 1 s.d. below to 1 s.d. above the mean. The partisan delegate measure is just outside of traditional significance levels ($p < .11$) and the effect is in the expected positive direction. With respect to member variables, the trade committee member and chamber of commerce variables are significant¹¹, with both in the expected positive direction. In the appendix, we report a reduced model in which we remove variables with high p-values (greater than .30). The only difference with respect to the results is that the partisan delegate measure becomes significant ($p < .05$).

If we consider the partisan constituency model (column 4), we find a similar pattern of results. To refresh, the only difference with the partisan constituency model is that we replace the mean constituency measures for retrospective assessments, spending preferences, and ideology with those of the partisan constituency. Again, the change in imports measure is significant and has a large substantive impact, decreasing the probability of voting for fast track by 36%. The percentage college educated in the state is close to significant ($p < .125$) and positive, as expected. As with the previous model, retrospective assessments are significant, though they exert an unexpected negative effect, while the spending factor is significant, positive,

¹¹ The partisan delegate free trade measure is highly correlated with the partisan identification of the member. If this measure is excluded, then the party of the member is significant.

and substantial, increasing the likelihood of voting for fast track by 38.2%. Finally, the trade committee dummy is significant and positive as expected, as is the Chamber of Commerce score.

Turning to the model performance measures, the results are a bit mixed as to whether the whole constituency or partisan constituency model performs better. While the Pseudo-R² of the whole constituency model is higher than the partisan model, .460 to .384, the percent correctly predicted and the proportional reduction in error are the same in both models (83.16% and .556, respectively). However, the fact that the partisan delegate measure is significant in the first model (and close to significant in the second model) lends support to the importance of party in the equation.

We now turn to how well the model performs with the inclusion of additional types of measures (See Appendix Table A2). If we look at the model that only includes the partisan identification of the member, we find that 70.53% of the cases are correctly predicted (also note that the party of the member is significant and negative). Considering that many argue that trade is not a party defining vote, it is striking to find the model performing so well with only this one variable. The model only incorrectly predicted 5 members as voting for fast track when they did not, though it incorrectly predicted 23 members as not voting for fast track even though they did. We see improvements to these predictions with the inclusion of the other types of variables. Adding member variables enhanced the model according to a likelihood ratio test and resulted in 73.68% of the cases correctly predicted (now only 16 members are incorrectly predicted as not voting for fast track). We also see a slight improvement with the addition of objective state measures, with 75.79% of the cases now correctly predicted (the inclusion of these measures also pass a likelihood ratio test). Finally, the addition of subjective and attitudinal measures also enhances the model, be it for the whole or partisan constituency. Now the percentage correctly

predicted is 83.16%. Overall, the inclusion of other member variables leads to slight improvements in the model, while the improvements are even greater with objective and subjective constituency measures.

With respect to the state objective factors, we find support for H1 in that the import change measure is significant and limited support for H3, in that the education measure is close to significant. This latter result is consistent with the results of Bailey (2003) who finds a significant effect for education (this is also consistent with Keech and Park's analysis of trade votes on 20 key House votes since WWII), though he does not find a significant effect for imports. However, we also find support for our argument (H5) in that constituency spending preferences influence the behavior of members, among both the whole and partisan constituency. Furthermore, we also find that the partisan delegate attitudes on free trade influence the behavior of members, in support of H7. Thus, it is not only objective constituency interests that drive votes, but constituency preferences on spending, and partisan delegates' attitudes on free trade. With respect to member variables, we do not find that the PAC measure is significant, while it is significant in Bailey's analysis (though he separates Labor and MNC donations), though we do find a significant effect for the Chamber of Commerce score (H11), which Bailey did not find.

NAFTA

The results for NAFTA are in Table 2.¹² Turning first to the whole constituency model, the trade openness measure is significant and in the expected direction.¹³ The effect is also fairly

¹² We could not include the Chamber of Commerce Score in this analysis because it was highly correlated with the party of the member.

¹³ We also ran random-intercept multi-level models using XT logit in STATA because intra-class correlations indicated that our observations were partly "nested" in states. The results for the logit and xtlogit models were consistent, so we report the logit models for ease of presentation. The only difference with the mean constituency model is that the trade committee dummy variable is significant in the multi-level model. The only difference with the party constituency model is that p-values for the partisan spending measure and partisan delegate measure move to just outside of a traditional significance level ($p < .12$ and $p < .14$, respectively), while the p-value on the PAC donations decreases to .106.

substantial, increasing the probability of voting for NAFTA by 21.3% moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean. The union measure is also significant, but in the unexpected direction, while the percent with a college degree is not significant. The objective state measures related more specifically to NAFTA are also significant, with projected job losses to Mexico exerting an unexpected positive effect and trade with Mexico exerting the expected positive effect. The effect for the trade measure with Mexico is very substantial, increasing the probability of voting for NAFTA by 72.2%. With respect to the constituency subjective and attitudinal measures, none of them are significant. However, the preferences of the partisan delegates on free trade are significant, positive, and substantial, increasing the probability of voting for NAFTA by 30.7%. None of the member variables are significant, though net PAC contributions and the trade committee dummy variable are close to significant ($p < .116$ and $p < .137$, respectively).¹⁴ The results are consistent if we remove the variables with high p-values (See Appendix, Table A3).

If we turn to the partisan constituency model, we find that the objective state results are consistent to the results from the mean constituency model, with significant effects for openness, union, trade with Mexico, and projected job losses to Mexico. The substantive effects of these variables are also substantial, increasing or decreasing the probability of voting by 34.3% moving the openness variable, 35.4% moving the union variable, 92.5% moving the trade with Mexico measure, and 74.8%, moving the projected job loss variable. As with the previous model, the retrospective evaluations are insignificant. However, now the partisan spending factor and ideology measures are significant, though both are in an unexpected direction. The partisan delegate measure is again significant and positive. Finally, Democrats were

¹⁴ If we remove the partisan delegate and PAC donations measures from the analysis, the party of the member and membership on the trade committee become significant. The two measures are highly correlated with the party of the member.

significantly less likely to vote for NAFTA, while those on the trade committee were significantly more likely to vote for NAFTA. The net PAC donations are in the expected direction and are close to significant ($p < .122$). Again, the results are consistent even if we remove variables with high p-values (See Appendix Table A3).

With respect to model performance, we find that the partisan constituency model slightly outperforms the whole constituency model. The partisan model has a higher Pseudo-R² (.452 compared to .356), percent correctly predicted (83.84% to 78.79%) and a higher proportional reduction in error (.451 to .447), than the whole constituency model.

We now turn to how well the model performs with the inclusion of additional types of measures (See Appendix Table A4). If we look at the model that only includes the partisan identification of the member, we find that 62.63% of the cases are correctly predicted (also note that the party of the member is significant and negative). The model incorrectly predicted 10 members as voting for NAFTA when they did not, and 27 members as voting against NAFTA when they voted for it. Adding member variables enhanced the model according to a likelihood ratio test and resulted in 69.70% of the cases correctly predicted. We see a bigger improvement with the addition of objective state measures, with 76.77% of the cases now correctly predicted (the inclusion of these measures also pass a likelihood ratio test). The addition of these variables helped reduce the cases in which members were predicted to vote against NAFTA when they in fact voted for it. The addition of subjective and attitudinal measures for the whole constituency does not pass a likelihood ratio test, though the addition of these measures for the partisan constituency does. With the partisan constituency measures, 83.86% of the cases are now correctly predicted, with only 8 members incorrectly predicted as voting against NAFTA and 8 incorrectly predicted as voting for NAFTA.

GATT

Finally, Table 3 presents the results for both models on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.¹⁵ Turning first to the whole constituency model, the union measure and percentage with a college degree measures are significant, with the former being in the unexpected direction. The measure for education exerts a sizeable effect, increasing the probability of voting for GATT by 21.3%. With respect to the mean retrospective and attitudinal measures, only the ideology variable is significant. This measure increases the probability of voting for GATT by 23.8%. However, the partisan delegate measure is not significant in this model. With respect to member variables, membership on the trade committee increases the likelihood of voting for GATT and net PAC contributions are close to significant ($p < .105$). The effects for these variables are modest, increasing the likelihood of voting for GATT by 10.2% for the trade committee measure and 15.7% for net PAC contributions. The results are mostly consistent with the reduced models, though the net PAC measure becomes significant, as does party identification of the constituency (though in the unexpected direction).

With respect to the partisan constituency model, the union measure is again significant in an unexpected positive direction, though the percent college educated is now outside of traditional significance levels ($p < .169$). In this model, none of the partisan constituency retrospective and attitudinal measures are significant, nor is the partisan delegate measure significant. Finally, net PAC contributions are significant, while membership on the trade

¹⁵ We again ran random-intercept multi-level models using XT logit in STATA because intra-class correlations indicated that our observations were partly “nested” in states. The results were again largely consistent between the reported logit results and the multi-level logit results; thus, we just report the logit results. For the mean constituency model, the only difference is that the trade committee dummy moves to just outside of a traditional significance level in the multi-level model ($p < .12$). For the party constituency model, there are no differences between logit and the multi-level logit model.

committee is close to significant ($p < .130$). The results are consistent with the reduced form models (see Appendix Table A5).

According to our measures of model performance, it appears that there are not many differences. The partisan model has a lower Pseudo-R² (.219 compared to .263), but a higher percent correctly predicted (83.84% to 82.83%) and proportional reduction in error (.304 to .261), than the whole constituency model.

Overall, we find evidence of weak constituency effects if we turn to likelihood ratio tests. Neither the mean constituency nor partisan constituency measures enhanced the performance of the model (See Appendix Table A6). However, we find evidence of the importance of the partisanship of the member. If we just include the party of the member as a regressor, 76.77% of the cases are correctly predicted, with only Republicans being incorrectly predicted as voting for GATT when they did not. If we add other member variables, the percentage correctly predicted remains the same. However, the inclusion of state objective indicators does enhance the model according to a likelihood ratio test, and the percentage correctly predicted increases to 82.83%.

Summary of 1993-1994 Votes

For both GATT and NAFTA, we find that many of the state objective indicators are significant, such as union membership (H3) and trade openness (H1) for NAFTA, and union and the percent with a college degree (H2) for GATT. However, in both models, the union measure is in the wrong direction. The results for education are consistent with the results for Bailey (2003), though he pooled all of the votes by year. Many studies have found that union membership exerts a significant negative effect on pro-free trade votes (e.g., Bailey 2003; Uslander 1998), though we find an effect opposite of expectations. Furthermore, we also found

that our NAFTA specific indicators were significant and exerted substantial effects. Overall, it appears that the state factors that are relevant may vary across votes.

In regard to our additional constituency based measures, which other studies have not considered, we found that partisan delegate preferences (H7) and partisan spending (H5) and ideology (H6b) had significant effects for NAFTA, with the latter being in an unexpected direction. Meanwhile, only the mean ideology measure (H6b) had a significant effect on the GATT vote, and the overall constituency preference measures did not enhance the performance of the model. It appears that taking into account constituency based measures is essential for understanding the voting behavior of members. However, we found that different types of constituencies mattered for each vote, with the partisan constituency being more influential for NAFTA and the ideology of the whole constituency being relevant for GATT. These findings fit in nicely with Hill and Hurley (2003) in that NAFTA was a much more salient vote; thus, constituency preference measures may have played a bigger role than for GATT.

Finally, with respect to member variables, we found that party of the member (H8) was only significant for NAFTA and not GATT. Gartzke and Wrighton (1998) found that the party of the member was significant for GATT, while we do not find significant effects for this variable. The differences in results are most likely due to the fact that Gartzke and Wrighton do not have the constituency measures that are used in our analysis.¹⁶ Consistent with results by Bailey (2003) and Uslander (1998), we found that PAC Money (H10) had significant effects for GATT, though it did not have a significant effect for NAFTA (though it was close to significant).¹⁷

¹⁶ In addition we did not have all of the measures that they used. We did not use unemployment measures or a dummy variable for the Senate Finance Committee.

¹⁷ Uslander also included measures that are not in our analysis such as whether the individual was contacted by Clinton, the presidential support score, whether the individual was a member of the conservative coalition, the % White and Hispanic, and the % farm population.

V. Discussion and Conclusions

Diffuse interests-based arguments overlook two important micro-linkages among economic circumstances, constituents' policy preferences, and representatives' behavior. First, they assume that voters' objective economic situations determine their policy preferences. Second, they assume that citizens' policy preferences in turn affect their representatives' behavior. While individuals' economic circumstances are clearly important in shaping attitudes, we contend that economic circumstances are not synonymous with policy preferences. Rather, we argue that long-term political beliefs mediate the political influence of economic conditions. This paper focuses on the second link, between citizens' economic situations and policy preferences and elite behavior.¹⁸

Using micro-level constituent evidence, we have shown that constituents' preferences, in addition to their economic circumstances, often exert an important influence on Senators' trade votes. Furthermore, we demonstrated that partisanship plays a role for each vote, though in different ways. For Fast Track in 1991, the preferences of partisan delegates were significant (after removing variables with high p-values), as were the spending preferences of the partisan (and whole) constituency. The party of the member and the preferences of the partisan delegates, were significant and in the expected direction for the NAFTA vote. The weakest effects obtained for GATT, where only the long-term predisposition of ideology had an effect on Senator's votes.

In finding consistent evidence that partisanship structures key trade votes, this study speaks to several literatures. First, it constitutes a difficult test for conditional party government hypotheses since trade votes are not considered strongly partisan (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).

¹⁸ Future analyses will also include a constituent ideology measure in the Senate voting model.

Evidence for the influence of Senators' partisan identification and the preferences of partisans and partisan delegates illuminates the wide-reaching effects of party during periods of high polarization. Second, our study addresses the literature on constituent-representative linkages. Many analysts argue that complex issues like trade votes minimize the influence of constituency preferences on legislative decision-making (Hill and Hurley 2003). Moreover, even studies that find some evidence of constituent influence (Bailey and Brady 1998) tend to use rough measures of presumed constituent *interest* rather than evidence of their actual *preferences*. Our data enable us to test partisan and constituent preferences, and we show that, during a period of high polarization, political parties influence trade choices in significant ways.

There are several avenues to improve the paper in future work. First, as expected, we do find that the variables that matter vary a bit across the three votes. One potential reason for the differences across votes could be the salience of the votes with the general public and the positions of key political actors. We hope to further investigate the context of each vote to see whether the significant effects may sense for each context. Second, we had a consistent effect for union membership that was opposite of expectations, and contrary to the literature. One feature of the variables in the model is that there is a high degree of collinearity, which may account for the unexpected sign. We will further explore reasons for this result in future analyses. Finally, in order to strengthen our argument, future work will incorporate micro-level models of the first link between citizens' economic situations, policy preferences, and voting behavior. We aim to demonstrate that partisan identification and ideology mediate the influence of economic conditions on individuals' political preferences and their vote choices. In this way, we will solidify our claim that long-term political beliefs critically affect both citizen policy preferences and legislative voting behavior.

Table 1: Fast Track

	Mean Constituency	First Difference+	Mean Party	First Difference+
Democratic Member	-.398 (1.534)	-.067 (.300)	1.627 (1.759)	-.067 (.300)
Trade Committee	1.806* (.950)	.255* (.142)	1.356 (.845)	.255 (.142)
Chamber of Commerce	.040* (.024)	.443* (.229)	.037* (.022)	.443* (.229)
Net PAC Money	-2.168 (2.578)	-.161 (.184)	-.702 (2.516)	-.161 (.184)
Change in Imports	-1485.063*** (570.510)	-.557*** (.180)	-1229.445** (502.174)	-.557 (.180)
% College Degree	.091 (.111)	.146 (.179)	.166 (.108)	.147 (.179)
Retrospective Assessments	-.956** (.433)	-.368 (.162)	-.713* (.403)	-.368 (.162)
Spending Preferences	1.557*** (.521)	.559 (.174)	1.297* (.668)	.559 (.173)
Party Identification	-1.187 (1.410)	-.167 (.192)	---	---
Ideology	-.822 (1.635)	-.083 (.181)	.305 (.824)	-.083 (.181)
Partisan Delegate Free Trade	2.441 (1.526)	.325 (.186)	1.692 (1.327)	-.325 (.186)
Constant	-2.371 (9.627)	---	-11.331 (7.219)	---
N	95	---	95	---
Chi-Squared	58.05	---	48.43	---
Prob Chi-Squared	.000	---	.000	---
Pseudo-R2	.460	---	.384	---
% Correctly Predicted	83.16	---	83.16	---
Proportional Reduction in Error	.556	---	.556	---

Standard error in parentheses. *** indicates $p < .01$, ** indicates $p < .05$, * indicates $p < .10$. + The change in the probability of voting for the free trade position moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean for continuous and ordinal measures and from the minimum to the maximum for dummy variables.

Table 2: NAFTA

	Mean Constituency	First Difference+	Mean Party	First Difference+
Democratic Member	.882 (1.103)	.173 (.224)	-4.715* (2.441)	-.592* (.245)
Trade Committee	1.316 (.884)	.123 (.100)	2.196* (1.116)	.410* (.197)
Net PAC Money	4.327 (2.752)	.205 (129)	4.638 (3.003)	.296 (.110)
Trade Openness	55.156** (27.196)	.213** (.123)	74.129** (30.108)	.343** (.137)
% College Degree	.071 (.112)	.085 (.135)	.068 (.113)	.088 (.158)
% Union	37.051** (19.018)	.272** (140)	39.008* (20.656)	.354* (.201)
Job Loss from Nafta	.0001*** (.0000)	.493*** (.151)	.0002*** (.0000)	.493*** (.151)
Trade with Mexico	.158*** (.054)	.722*** (.172)	.255*** (.075)	.722*** (.172)
Retrospective Assessments	.032 (.402)	.006 (.132)	-.295 (.722)	-.098 (.261)
Spending Preferences	-.237 (367)	-.077 (.125)	-1.189* (.625)	-.429 (.206)
Party Identification	.050 (1.058)	.010 (.136)	---	---
Ideology	-1.005 (1.307)	-.108 (.152)	-2.105** (.853)	-.554** (.180)
Partisan Delegate Free Trade	2.837** (1.408)	.307** (.147)	2.429 (1.490)	.349 (.223)
Constant	-8.418 (7.716)	---	-.564 (6.392)	---
N	99	---	99	---
Chi-Squared	46.95	---	59.47	---
Prob Chi-Squared	.000	---	.000	---
Pseudo-R2	.356	---	.451	---
% Correctly Predicted	78.79	---	83.84	---
Proportional Reduction in Error	.447	---	.579	---

Standard error in parentheses. *** indicates $p < .01$, ** indicates $p < .05$, * indicates $p < .10$. + The change in the probability of voting for the free trade position moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean for continuous and ordinal measures and from the minimum to the maximum for dummy variables.

Table 3: GATT

	Mean Constituency	First Difference+	Mean Party	First Difference+
Democratic Member	.920 (1.103)	.140 (.170)	.363 (1.769)	.064 (.273)
Trade Committee	1.919 (1.180)	.104 (.082)	1.797 (1.187)	.126 (.120)
Net PAC Money	4.542 (2.802)	.157 (.097)	5.102* (2.739)	.205* (.127)
Trade Openness	-28.894 (26.800)	-.083 (.084)	-10.984 (23.412)	-.034 (.087)
% College Degree	.248* (.131)	.213* (.141)	.163 (.119)	.152 (.131)
% Union	50.964** (23.051)	.295** (.141)	55.718** (25.363)	.349** (.166)
Retrospective Assessments	-.302 (.423)	-.073 (.108)	-.381 (.651)	-.122 (.197)
Spending Preferences	-.038 (.335)	-.017 (.094)	-.619 (.587)	-.178 (.180)
Party Identification	-1.231 (1.047)	-.105 (.105)	---	---
Ideology	3.013** (1.364)	.245** (.137)	.794 (.739)	.136 (.155)
Partisan Delegate Free Trade	1.522 (1.302)	.119 (.115)	.865 (1.238)	.067 (.129)
Constant	-17.773** (8.592)	---	-8.747 (6.761)	---
N	99	---	99	---
Chi-Squared	28.21	---	23.53	---
Prob Chi-Squared	.003	---	.009	---
Pseudo-R2	.263	---	.219	---
% Correctly Predicted	82.83	---	83.84	---
Proportional Reduction in Error	.261	---	.304	---

Standard error in parentheses. *** indicates $p < .01$, ** indicates $p < .05$, * indicates $p < .10$. + The change in the probability of voting for the free trade position moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean for continuous and ordinal measures and from the minimum to the maximum for dummy variables.

Appendix

Table A1: Fast Track Reduced Models

	Mean Constituency	First Difference+	Mean Party	First Difference+
Democratic Member	-1.149 (.995)	-.214 (.193)	1.405 (1.508)	.274 (.286)
Trade Committee	1.481* (.872)	.267* (.140)	1.310 (.813)	.132 (.104)
Chamber of Commerce	---	---	.034* (.019)	.281* (.155)
Net PAC Money	---	---	---	---
Change in Imports	-1392.033*** (522.858)	-.351*** (.142)	-1240.493** (489.424)	-.375 (.150)
% College Degree	---	---	.143 (.090)	.166 (.122)
Retrospective Assessments	-.797** (.340)	-.351** (.142)	-.680* (.395)	-.199 (.133)
Spending Preferences	1.335*** (.365)	.541*** (.126)	1.385* (.635)	.382 (.158)
Party Identification	---	---	---	---
Ideology	---	---	---	---
Partisan Delegate Free Trade	2.752** (1.381)	.419 (.179)	1.611 (1.301)	156 (.133)
Constant	-6.244 (3.396)	---	-9.033** (4.191)	---
N	95	---	95	---
Chi-Squared	54.28	---	48.20	---
Prob Chi-Squared	.000	---	.000	---
Pseudo-R2	.431	---	.382	---
% Correctly Predicted	84.21	---	83.16	---
Proportional Reduction in Error	.583	---	.556	---

Standard error in parentheses. *** indicates $p < .01$, ** indicates $p < .05$, * indicates $p < .10$. + The change in the probability of voting for the free trade position moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean for continuous and ordinal measures and from the minimum to the maximum for dummy variables.

Table A2: Fast Track Model Performance

<u>Model</u>	<u>Percent Correctly Predicted</u>	<u>LR Test*</u>	<u># of Members incorrectly predicted at 0</u>	<u># of Members incorrectly predicted at 1</u>
Dummy for Party of Rep only	70.53%	-----	23	5
Adding other member variables	73.68%	.103	16	9
Adding objective indicators	75.79%	.003	10	13
Adding constituency opinion measures and delegate	83.16%	.002	7	9
Adding party opinion measures and delegate instead of mean	83.16%	.049	9	7

The LR Test uses the previous model as the baseline.

Table A3: NAFTA Reduced Models

	Mean Constituency	First Difference+	Mean Party	First Difference+
Democratic Member	1.038 (1.074)	.196 (.197)	-4.100** (2.118)	-.516* (.222)
Trade Committee	1.191 (.846)	.111 (.100)	2.118* (1.135)	.378* (.190)
Net PAC Money	4.411 (2.711)	.202 (.121)	4.571 (3.035)	.309 (.204)
Trade Openness	55.819** (27.196)	.202** (.121)	65.443** (27.190)	.332** (.133)
% College Degree	.071 (.108)	.081 (.131)	---	---
% Union	37.448** (18.570)	.265** (.135)	41.915* (20.544)	.395* (.196)
Job Loss from Nafta	.0002*** (.0000)	.462*** (.136)	.0003*** (.0000)	.762*** (.135)
Trade with Mexico	.153*** (.052)	.706*** (.170)	.251*** (.074)	.926*** (.104)
Retrospective Assessments	---	---	---	---
Spending Preferences	---	---	-1.207* (.596)	-.452 (.195)
Party Identification	---	---	---	---
Ideology	-.886 (1.160)	-.094 (.133)	-2.181*** (.853)	-.598** (.181)
Partisan Delegate Free Trade	2.918** (1.326)	.315** (.138)	3.001** (1.296)	.441 (.192)
Constant	-9.152 (7.518)	---	-.377 (5.871)	---
N	99	---	99	---
Chi-Squared	46.42	---	58.74	---
Prob Chi-Squared	.000	---	.000	---
Pseudo-R2	.352	---	.445	---
% Correctly Predicted	80.81	---	82.83	---
Proportional Reduction in Error	.500	---	.552	---

Standard error in parentheses. *** indicates $p < .01$, ** indicates $p < .05$, * indicates $p < .10$. + The change in the probability of voting for the free trade position moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean for continuous and ordinal measures and from the minimum to the maximum for dummy variables.

Table A4: NAFTA Model Performance

<u>Model</u>	<u>Percent Correctly Predicted</u>	<u>LR Test*</u>	<u># of Members incorrectly predicted at 0</u>	<u># of Members incorrectly predicted at 1</u>
Dummy for Party of Rep only	62.63%	-----	27	10
Adding other member variables	69.70%	.039	10	20
Adding objective indicators	76.77%	.000	11	12
Adding constituency opinion and delegate measures	78.79%	.181	11	10
Adding partisan constituency measures and delegate measures	83.84%	.001	8	8

The LR Test uses the previous model as the baseline.

Table A5: GATT Reduced Models

	Mean Constituency	First Difference+	Mean Party	First Difference+
Democratic Member	1.101 (1.059)	.181 (.167)	.772 (.867)	.119 (.139)
Trade Committee	1.873 (1.143)	.093 (.072)	1.641 (1.132)	.106 (.077)
Net PAC Money	4.740 (2.734)	.158 (.088)	5.629** (2.610)	.224* (.089)
Trade Openness	-30.624 (26.884)	-.080 (.084)	---	-.033 (.080)
% College Degree	.249* (.128)	.200* (.131)	.140* (.119)	.115 (.084)
% Union	56.040** (22.337)	.312** (.137)	60.122** (22.071)	.390** (.144)
Retrospective Assessments	---	---	---	---
Spending Preferences	---	---	---	---
Party Identification	-1.602* (.919)	-.131 (.096)	---	---
Ideology	2.911** (1.336)	.218** (.130)	---	--
Partisan Delegate Free Trade	1.688 (1.257)	.127 (.110)	---	.115 (.084)
Constant	-16.915** (8.321)	---	-3.423* (1.869)	---
N	99	---	99	---
Chi-Squared	27.58	---	19.88	---
Prob Chi-Squared	.001	---	.001	---
Pseudo-R2	.257	---	.185	---
% Correctly Predicted	82.83	---	81.82	---
Proportional Reduction in Error	.261	---	.217	---

Standard error in parentheses. *** indicates $p < .01$, ** indicates $p < .05$, * indicates $p < .10$. + The change in the probability of voting for the free trade position moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean for continuous and ordinal measures and from the minimum to the maximum for dummy variables.

Table A6: GATT model performance

<u>Model</u>	<u>Percent Correctly Predicted</u>	<u>LR Test*</u>	<u># of Members incorrectly predicted at 0</u>	<u># of Members incorrectly predicted at 1</u>
Dummy for Party of Rep only	76.77%	-----	0	23
Adding other member variables	76.77%	.087	0	23
Adding objective indicators	82.83%	.001	1	16
Adding constituency opinion and delegate measures	82.83%	.151	4	13
Adding party constituency and delegate measures	83.84%	.491	1	15

The LR Test uses the previous model as the baseline.

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